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COMMENTS
when the defendant has interfered to protect a presently existing
economic interest, 28 or to give advice in response to a request by one
of the contracting parties,- or to protect the interests of a person
toward whom he stands in a position of responsibility."0 It would
seem that if recovery is to be permitted at all in an action involving
interference with an unenforceable contract, these same privileges
should be recognized.3 '
Apparently the court in the principal case has determined that ac-
tions for interference with contract should be restricted to situations
in which there is a legally enforceable contract. To those who view
with suspicion the tort of inducing breach of contract, such an attitude
seems perfectly justifiable. Courts which accept the view adopted in
the principal case thus will dismiss the action as a matter of law when-
ever the pleadings disclose that the contract was unenforceable be-
tween the parties. If the majority view is accepted, however, whether
recovery is to be permitted should depend, not merely on a matter of
pleading, but rather on a careful factual determination of whether the
interest of the defendant is of sufficient merit to justify his interfer-
ence with the relationship between the contracting parties.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNER FOR NEGLIGENCE
OF Ex-CONVICT SERVANT
Boland v. Love, 222 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
Plaintiff was injured due to the negligent driving of defendant's
gardener, who had taken defendant's automobile from its garage in
(b) the nature of the expectancy with which his conduct interferes,
(c) the relations between the parties,
(d) the interest sought to be advanced by the actor and
(e) the social interests in protecting the expectancy on the one hand and
the actor's freedom of action on the other hand.
For specific privilege situations, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 768-74 (1939);
§ 768 (privilege of competitor), § 769 (privilege of one having financial interest
in business of person induced), § 770 (privilege of person responsible for welfare
of another), § 771 (inducement to influence another's business policy), § 772
(privilege to advise), § 773 (privilege to assert bona fide claim), § 774 (privilege
to break restriction violative of public policy).
27. The following list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
28. Meason v. Ralston Purina Co., 56 Ariz. 291, 107 P.2d 224 (1940) (mort-
gagee); O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 62 Wash. 598, 114 Pac. 441 (1911)
(lessor of property).
29. It is often the duty of lawyers, doctors, and bankers to give such advice.
However, the privilege is not limited to professional persons. See Arnold v.
Moffitt, .30 R.I. 310, 75 At. 502 (1910) (in answer to request, electrical inspector
for insurance company advised employer that plaintiff's bill for electrical work
was exorbitant).
30. Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67 (1906) (mother attempting to protect
child); Terry v. Zachry, 272 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (employee in-
ducing corporation to litigate claim).
31. One writer has suggested that liability should depend on motive; there
should be no liability unless the interfering defendant sought the same object
as did the plaintiff in making the contract. Sayre, supra note 3, at 663.
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the District of Columbia and, without permission to leave the premises,
had gone to Virginia for purposes of his own. In addition to his du-
ties as gardener, the servant was at times required to idle the engines
of defendant's automobiles in order to keep the batteries charged and
occasionally to drive the automobiles around to the front of the house.
At no time was he given permission to drive the automobiles off the
premises. On the day of the accident the keys to the automobiles were
placed at his disposal so that he might charge the batteries. He was
left at the house alone and without supervision. It was known to
defendant that the servant had twice been convicted of larceny and
had no driver's license. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict
after plaintiff's opening statement. The court of appeals, in reversing
the judgment for defendant, held that upon these facts negligence
and proximate cause were jury questions.,
In the opening statement, plaintiff offered to prove that: (1) de-
fendant knew that the servant had twice been convicted of larceny
and had spent almost half his life in penal institutions-this was to
show that defendant should have known that the servant was untrust-
worthy; (2) defendant, knowing that the servant had no driver's
license, should have known that he was an incompetent driver and
thus was not qualified for such a license; (3) defendant gave the keys
to his automobile to this untrustworthy, incompetent servant and left
him without any supervision whatsoever.2 Giving plaintiff the benefit
of all inferences which may be drawn from the opening statement, and
resolving all doubt in plaintiff's favor,' did plaintiff state a cause
of action?
It is submitted that there are three separate theories upon which
a plaintiff could proceed in cases of this general nature. (1) A master
is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the negligent
acts of his servant done within the course of employment. 4 (2) The
owner of an automobile who knows or should know of the incom-
petency, intemperance, or recklessness of a third person, and who
permits the third person to use the automobile, converts the automo-
1. Boland v. Love, 222 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Since the accident occurred in
Virginia and suit was brought in the District of Columbia, a question as to the
proper law to be applied was presented. The court held that .Virginia law should
govern, but since there apparently was no Virginia case in point the Virginia
law would be presumed to be the same as that of the District of Columbia. Id. at
32. The conflict of laws problem in the case is beyond the scope of this comment.
2. Id. at 36.
3. Id. at 36-37; see Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1934);
Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930); Tobin v. Pennsylvania R.R., 100 F.2d
435, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
4. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 219 (1933); 2 MECHEM, AGENCY § 1874 (2d ed.
1914). ...
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bile into a dangerous instrumentality' and is liable for his own negli-
gence under the doctrine of entrustment (S) If an owner of an
automobile creates an unreasonable risk of harm, he can be held
accountable under general principles of tort liability for negligence
when an injury occurs from a realization of that riska While upon
the facts of the instant case defendant is not liable under the first of
these theories (the servant's acts were clearly beyond the scope of his
employment), it is not clear whether the court determined that the
jury might find liability on the basis of the entrustinent doctrine or
whether it relied upon general princples of negligence law, or both.
It would appear, however, that the entrustment doctrine does not
apply to these facts for the reason that the servant was never given
pernission to operate the automobile beyond defendanfs premises-
there simply was no entrustmet.
In other District of Columbia cases involving similar factual situa-
tions, liability has been based upon general principles of tort liability
for negligence. In Ross v. Hartman. I where a thief stole defendant's
automobiMe and negligently injured plaintiff, the court held, as a mat-
ter of law, that there were both negligence and proximate causm
Defendant's violation of a statute prohibiting the leaving of keys in
the ignition of an unattended automobile was held to be negligence
per se. In Soeaff r. Claxton 3 another "key-in-the-ignition" case,
it was held to be a jury question whether defendant was negligent
and, if so, whether that negligence was the proximate cause of the
injuries which plaintiff received as a result of the negligent opera-
tion of the defendant's automobile by a thief.
On the facts of the principal case, it would be possible for a jury to
find in support of the view that defendant was negligent that: (I)
defendant knew or should have known that the servant was untrust-
5, Crowell v. Du can, 145 Va, 489 10-10184 SR 576 581-M (1MO6, quotbag
from Gardinar v. Soloon, 200 Aa L6, 117,71 168
6. Williamson v, Eclips Rotor Lines Inc, 1 Ohio St . , 0n on2 I
ALR, 1880 (1I48).
7. Crowell v Ducan, 148 Va. 49 184 M 876 (126' RV;TOs
§§ SCbl $08 M$0 (1984); 8 Ax. h, Aatomladtes § o 98> Annt, 168
A .0 Jhn FM4 1WO 19 F)d 808 (D.C. Mr. I w cav laxto 1
F17 M (D.C. Cir. _(194; Ross . Hartman, W89 Rd 13. 1 ; S
v r, ,Tea. temApp, 577, , SW 24 Im-
Ot This was the major premise Of the di:Ws: B6e towPdtv aN=F2 27, 3
tPS,. Cir. 19885) (d5senting opinion).
10, 1I:0 d 14 (D.O. Cir. 194); accord, Nay . Yellow Cab Oo.4 21l. Sd
117 NX.E24 74t (1984>; Ostergard v. Ydsch 88 Ml A . 80, 77 N.2d88(1948>. In the lattesr two case, violations ak "key-nte-pFZsaueswr
held to ho- merely evidence of n lgence See erally, Note 1968 WAsH U.417M Cogira, 4~., Richards v, Ianley, 48 05T72d 60, 271 R.2d 28 (1954) ' l
that there was no n lience because there was no duty owed tot plitiff>.
11. 144 R.2d R8 VD.G. Civ. 1944).
12. The District of Columbia "key-n-the-lgnto " statue was not applicable
because the automobile was not parked on a publie st
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worthy,1" and therefore should have anticipated that the servant might
either steal the car (the reasonable man looks upon ex-convicts with
suspicion) or go on a "frolic of his own" (for the same reasons) ;
(2) defendant should have known that the servant was an incom-
petent driver, since he knew that the servant had no license to drive
(licenses are granted to those who are qualified but are withheld
from incompetent drivers) ;14 (3) persons apt to go on "frolics" are
likely to take unnecessary chances in their haste to return without
having their disobedience discovered; (4) with knowledge of these
factors, defendant left the servant in control of the automobile
without supervision of any kind. Thus, the jury could conclude
that a reasonable man would have taken steps to prevent the servant
from obtaining access to the car, that defendant failed to take such
steps, and that he therefore was negligent. If, as was determined in
the Ross and Schwff cases, it is negligent to leave the keys in the
ignition of an unattended automobile because of the danger that a
thief might take the automobile and cause injury to another, it would
certainly seem that the jury could find that it constitutes negligence
to leave automobile keys in the possession of an unsupervised servanb
who is known to be an ex-convict and who is 1known to have no license
to drive. It is therefore submitted that the principal case logically
follows the Ross and Schaff decisions.'5
It should be noted that upon the facts of the principal case there
should be no problem of intervening independent cause negating lia-
bility.16 If there was negligence here, it consisted in the creation of
an unreasonable risk of danger because of the probable negligent acts
of the defendant's servant. It cannot be said that the materialization
of the very danger, the creation of which constitutes negligence, also
constitutes an intervening independent force insulating defendant
from liability for that negligence. The chance of harm is included in
the negligence for which defendant is sought to be held.17 If the de-
13. 222 F.2d at 36.
14. Id. at 33.
15. Five of the eight judges on the present Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia have concurred in the reasoning of this line of cases [Judges Danaher
and Bazelon in Boland v. Love, supra note 1; Edgerton and Prettyman in Claxton
v. Schaff, 169 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Edgerton and Miller in Schaff v. Claxton,
supra note 11]. Judge Bastian, in Boland v. Love, supra, is the only member of
the present court who has expressly rejected the doctrine laid down by these cases.
16. Contra, 222 F.2d at 41 (dissenting opinion).
17. See cases cited in notes 8 and 10 supra (Richards v. Stanley, supra note 10,
agrees with the other cases cited in regard to the problem of intervening negli-
gence). See also Pnossua, TORTs 268-70 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §
449 (1934) states:
If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular
manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent,
such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal
does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
See also Note, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 173.
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fendant in the principal case was negligent because he made it pos-
sible for his servant to harm someone, it certainly cannot be said
that defendant should not be liable for the harm actually caused by
the servant.
Because, upon these facts, there is "an unbroken chain of causes
and effects" leading from the act of the defendant to the injury of the
plaintiff, the only remaining problem of causation is whether the act
constituted a substantial factor in bringing about the resultant in-
jury. 1 It is submitted that there is no doubt that defendant's act was
such a substantial factor.' Therefore, the question of defendant's
liability, if submitted to the jury, should turn solely upon the issue
of negligence.
The point is made in the dissenting opinion that the effect of this
decision is that ex-convicts can be employed only at an employer's
peril,'- and it thus becomes even more difficult for these persons to
achieve rehabilitation. While the majority of the court denies that
such is the effect of this case,2 1 it is perhaps more realistic to concede
that the reluctance of District of Columbia employers to hire ex-
convicts will hereafter be increased as a result of this decision. Thus,
the court has had to weigh two opposing policy considerations-the
policy of favoring the rehabilitation of former convicts and that of
compensating innocent injured plaintiffs. In deciding that defendant's
conduct may constitute negligence, the court indicates that the latter
of these policies is overriding. It should be noted, however, that the
court emphasized the fact that the servant was known to have no
license to drive, as well as the fact that he was known to be an ex-
convict. Thus, in the absence of either one of these factors, a contrary
result would seem to be indicated.
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 433, reasons for changes i, ii, iii at 733-34 (Supp.
1948).
19. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 433 (Supp. 1948) provides that the following
facts are important in determining whether conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the result:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and
the extent of the effect which they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which
are in continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has
created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the
actor is not responsible;
(c) lapse of time.
The exact period of time which elapsed between the taking of the car and the ac-
cident does not appear in the instant case. The car was taken in the morning,
however, and the accident occurred in the afternoon of the same day. See 222 F.2d
at 30. It is submitted that, as a matter of law, such a short time lag should not
serve as a basis for assertion of lack of proximate cause as a defense. See, how-
ever, Note, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 173, 181, where it is suggested that a situation of
this sort might create a jury question as to proximate cause.
For an interesting discussion of the problems, and for a substantial clarification
of the issues involved in proximate cause, see Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA.
L. RmV. 211 (1924).
20. 222 F.2d at 41.
21. Id. at 36.
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